ELLEN BARRY
ESSAY


MOSCOW - In August of last year, a new Russia presented itself to the world. From the battlefield of Georgia, the message said: We are no longer seeking the good opinion of the West. The new taste for confrontation was seen by many as a byproduct of oil and gas wealth, which had given Russia’s leaders the confidence to risk international isolation.

That thesis may have a short shelf life. Russian leaders, no longer hoping to make the ruble an international reserve currency, now face a confluence of disasters: The price of a barrel of oil has slid below $40, shares of Gazprom fell 76 percent in a year and more than a quarter of Russia’s cash reserves have been spent shoring up the ruble.

But does that mean we can expect a thaw between Russia and America- The question arises at a moment of high tension.

The deadlock between Russia and Ukraine on gas prices has drawn in all of Europe; violence in Georgia could flare up again. Barack Obama’s Russia policymakers are taking office under the pressure of unfolding events.

Henry Kissinger, who was in Moscow last month, is offering the hopeful view that the global financial crash could lead to“an age of compatible interests.”But others see the crisis pushing Russia in the opposite direction. So there are two paths:


Scenario 1: Cooperation

In the global financial collapse, as Alexander Rahr of Germany’s Council on Foreign Relations put it:“We have all become weaker. We have all become poorer.”So, pressed by domestic concerns, both sides pare back their foreign ambitions. Washington slows its timetable on NATO expansion and missile defense; Russia defers the dream of recapturing the Soviet “privileged sphere of influence.”Leaders in Moscow present this to the public as a victory.

The logic here is straightforward: A cash-strapped Russia would need Western money and technology to develop its energy fields. Power grabs like Russia’s past moves against BP and Shell Oil would look counterproductive. The“battle of ideas”within the Kremlin, as Igor Y.Yurgens, an adviser to President Dmitri A.Medvedev, describes it, would turn away from“isolation, seclusion, imperial instincts”and toward long-term partnership with the West.


Scenario 2: Retrenchment and Nationalism “Less resources means more selfish behavior,” as Sergei A.Markov, director of the Institute of Political Studies in Moscow, has said. In this case, Russia finds itself facing internal dissent and the threat of regional separatism. Forced to fight for their own survival, political leaders focus on an external enemy - the United States, which leaders have already blamed for Russia’s financial crisis.

Which scenario is more likely- The first scenario, in which economic considerations dictate a more subdued foreign policy, requires conditions that may not exist. In the government, economic liberals might challenge hardliners. The constituencies who might back them up are ones that fell silent during the boom.

“People in epaulets who feel they are middle class, people in bureaucracy who feel they are middle class, they could be part of this coalition,”Mr.Yurgens said.“Whether this coalition will be strong enough, I have no way of knowing.”