SEOUL U.S. military forces in South Korea have been in the spotlight in recent months, and there has been an intensification of effort among some South Korean non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to "blacklist" U.S. Forces in Korea as their next target following success in campaigning against suspect politicians during the April National Assembly election campaign. The aftermath of President Kim Dae-jung s visit to Pyongyang has also sent ambiguous signals regarding the future roles of U.S. Forces in Korea, unleashing demands for revision of U.S. troop roles among some Korean NGOs despite the fact that no substantive change in the security equation has yet accompanied the symbolism of the handshake between the two Korean leaders.
This is not the first time that anti-American sentiment has surfaced in South Korea, nor is it surprising that such a complex relationship as that which exists between the United States and South Korea might involve occasional periods of tension as part of close cooperation. However, the recent response to problems related to U.S. force presence, suggests a need to step back and carefully examine what lies behind it. In the process, both sides should carefully, patiently, and flexibly weigh their own respective national interests before over-reacting to incidents that, under ordinary circumstances, should be possible to resolve without major difficulties.
The previous wave of anti-American sentiment in Korea accompanied the 1988 Olympics and Koreas transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Much anti-Americanism of that time was also bottled up anti-authoritarianism that finally spewed out in the form of antagonism toward perceived American backing for the Chun Doo-whan dictatorship. A second aspect of anti-Americanism at that time was related to feelings that international media criticisms of South Korea during the Olympics somehow meant that the outside world had failed to give South Koreans well-earned credit for the progress of its economic and political transformation.
The current round of anti-American demonstrations is, in some respects, different from the 1980s because it seems to be so highly focused on opposition to the U.S. military in South Korea. Some American analysts have noted with concern that, unlike past anti-American demonstrations, recent incidents have involved expressions of physical violence toward individual members of U.S. forces in Korea, in contrast to past willingness to separate individual Americans from criticism of U.S. government policies.
In some cases, this violence is motivated by the widespread Korean misperception that U.S. troop presence is so essential to U.S. global strategy that we would never leave, when in fact, the situation is quite the opposite. Most American servicemen, particularly those with families, would prefer not to come to Korea, where the quality of life on the bases is low and the cost of living is high. But they come to fulfill the mission of defending Korea from external aggression, and for decades, their sacrifice has generally, been met with appreciation by most Koreans.
Imagine, however, what a shock it would be to be assigned to provide for the defense of a foreign people, only to encounter insensitive verbal abuses or physical injury from those whom you are sent to protect. This new element is particularly dangerous because it has the potential to unleash political forces that would sour the broader relationship between our two countries, possibly sacrificing the opportunity to pursue shared economic and political interests. Neither Congress nor the American public will tolerate physical danger to American troops from "friends" preceived as ungrateful for their sacrifice.
There is also one important similarity between the current atmosphere and the situation as it existed in the late 1980s. Just as the transition to democracy occasioned reflection about international perceptions of Korea at that time, Koreasrecovery from the financial crisis, OECD membership in the club of industrialized economies, relative optimism concerning Koreaաs future regional and global roles, and the summit with its symbolism of the two Koreas on the threshold of a new era of reconciliation have also occasioned both reflection and a feeling that Koreas economic might should be matched by greater autonomy in security affairs.
Just as the last major revisions to the U.S.-ROK security relationship were initiated in the early 1990s in recognition of Korea s changed political and security situation, I believe that South Koreans are once again seeking both symbolic affirmation of the progress and consolidation of political and economic development during the past decade as well as a concrete American expression of recognition and support for Korean reunification.
Specifically, Koreans are insisting through negotiations on revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that it is no longer acceptable to suggest that South Korean political and judicial institutions are less well-developed than those in other industrialized countries with a U.S. troop presence such as Germany and Japan. More broadly, Koreans want to know that U.S. regional security interests do not stand in the way of progress in the inter-Korean relationship.
It should be possible for the U.S. government to affirm South Koreas progress in consolidating its own political institutions and to respond to concrete changes in the security situation on the Korean peninsula in concert with substantive progress in inter-Korean relations; however, working out the appropriate adjustments in the relationship will require intensive political consultations at the highest levels. The task of initiating a comprehensive review and adjustment of the U.S.-ROK security relationship in recognition of new developments between the two Koreas, should be a top priority for the next administration in Washington when it takes office early next year.
As we have seen in the Philippines and other places around the world, the United States has its own strategic interests, but its foreign-based troops are guests, not imperial manifestations of colonial hegemony, a point that was reaffirmed by President Clinton during his speech to U.S. troops in Okinawa last month. The ultimate decision about whether U.S. forces remain in Korea depends on the perceptions of the Korean people and their government regarding how best to address Korea s own security needs; the relationship itself will remain viable only to the extent that both Americans and South Koreans perceive joint coordination in pursuit of their common interests as valuable.

The writer is the Korea Representative of the Asia Foundation and author of Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior. The opinions expressed above are personal views and do not necessarily represent those of the Asia Foundation and The Korea Times as well.